Taiwanized "New Taiwanese": The effect of Taiwanization on the 2008 presidential election campaign of Ma Ying-jeou by Kaeding, MP
 1 
Taiwanized “New Taiwanese”: The Effect of Taiwanization on the 2008 
Presidential Election Campaign of Ma Ying-jeou 
 
In: Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2009) Manila, pp. 19-34 
 
Malte Philipp Kaeding, Hong Kong Baptist University 
mkaeding@sino.uni-heidelberg.de 
 
 
Abstract: This article argues that the 2008 Presidential election campaign of the KMT 
candidate Ma Ying-jeou witnessed a shift in the identity content of the KMT concept 
of “New Taiwanese” from the civic side of the spectrum towards the ethnic side. In 
order to become electable, Ma Ying-jeou had to portray a very “Taiwanized” image. 
This suggests the strong impact of two decades of Taiwanization policies, focused on 
the ethnic and cultural realm, on the political market of Taiwan. The emergence of the 
“culturally enhanced” concept of “New Taiwanese” emphasizes the importance of 
cultural and ethnical discourses in national identity formation. After Ma’s election, 
his stance towards China has lacerated once again the conflict of identities that will 
continue to shape the future of the islands.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Taiwan identity has been the topic of scholarly interest since the country’s transition 
to democracy (Wachmann, 1994). Research shows that the number of people 
identifying themselves identified as Taiwanese, or Taiwanese and Chinese, has been 
rising constantly over the past decade; while the number of those identifying 
themselves as Chinese has sharply fallen
1
 (Election Studies Center , 2007).  National 
identity has become an election topic since the early days of democratization; and 
parties utilize the issue to mobilize voters and to position themselves. In 2008 the 
winner of the Presidential Elections was Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang KMT 
中國國民黨) candidate, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). Many commentators concluded that 
his election marked the end of identity politics in Taiwan and that it was not an issue 
during the campaign. 
 
This article argues that, although the 2008 campaign apparently was dominated by 
economic issues and future relations with China, identity indeed played a key role. 
Ma Ying-jeou had to convince the Taiwanese voters that he would not sell out the 
country to China, and therefore made great efforts to demonstrate his 
“Taiwaneseness.” His articulation of Taiwan identity in the campaign reflects two 
decades of Taiwanization
2
 policies in the Republic of China (ROC 中華民國). The 
                                                 
1
 According to data by the National Cheng-Chih University Taiwan, the number of people 
identifying themselves as Taiwanese has risen from 17.3% in 1992, to 43.7% in 2007. While in 1992, 
26.2% of Taiwan’s people considered themselves to be Chinese, in 2007 it was a mere 6.5%. The most 
frequent identity category is a combined Taiwanese/Chinese identity, chosen by 44.5% in 2007 (45.4% 
in 1992) (Election Studies Center, National Cheng-Chi University Taiwan).  
 
2
 The Chinese term used for Taiwanization is 本土化 ; this can also be translated as 
“nativization”, “localization” or “indigenization”. Yet Bruce Jacobs argues that these terms are not 
appropriate. “Localization” would convey the Chinese idea that Taiwan is only a “local” government. 
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broad acceptance in the public of these policies, especially in the cultural area, and the 
dramatic increase of identification as Taiwanese, have framed the identity debate and 
the political market. Following the Downsian argument of parties as vote-maximizing 
entities (Downs, 1957), a move in the direction of the ideological center of Taiwan 
identity could be observed.
3
 The KMT has maneuvered towards fully embracing this 
Taiwan identity. Yet, the strong ethnic and cultural undertone of Taiwanization under 
the second Chen administration, together with Ma as a so-called mainlander candidate, 
posed a great challenge to the campaign. How could Ma Ying-jeou be perceived as 
truly Taiwanese while still appealing to other identities and ethnic groups? How 
would he formulate Taiwan identity and what components of it would the campaign 
emphasize? Which campaign instruments and strategies would be used to convey the 
Taiwanese image of the candidate? Essentially the campaign would involve steering  
to the ethnic realm of identity while upholding the civic-based “New Taiwanese” 
identity. This paper argues that as a solution to this potential campaign problem, the 
KMT employed the concept of a “culturally recharged” “New Taiwanese”.  
An exposition of theories of national identity construction will be given to provide the 
theoretical background for this study; to be followed by a short introduction into the 
development of Taiwan identity. Approaches to the analysis of this issue will likewise 
be given.  
Examinations of different stages of Taiwanization policies underscore their evolution 
as well as their impact on past election campaigns. Findings gathered during a field 
trip to Taiwan during the elections provide detailed information on election strategies 
and instruments. Together with a content analysis of Ma Ying-jeou’s election 
platform and an ethnographic study of campaign promotion material, all this will 
demonstrate the identity option of the KMT and present the main subject of this paper. 
Lastly, conclusions on the further development of Taiwanization and Taiwan identity 
are drawn.   
 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
Debates have arisen on the origin of nations, nationalism and national identity shifts  
The essentialist or primordial view on national identity assumes that certain group 
identities and attachments are given, based on blood, race, language, territory. 
Clifford Geertz believes that primordial identities are natural and possess an 
“ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves” (Geertz, 
1973, p. 259), as essentially, these identities deal with sentiments or affection 
(Llobera, 2004, p. 185). Yet Geertz and other modern primordialist theorists agree 
with the relativistic notion that even as the primordial bonds are assumed, they are  
powerful because they are perceived to be real (Schubert, 2002, p. 57 ff).  
On the other hand the constructivist approach to the study of nationalism and national 
identity sees the nation as an “imagined political community” (Anderson, 1983, p. 6). 
It stresses the invention and construction of a nation and refuses ethnic perennialism. 
Thus, by way of example, it accepts the possibility of a rediscovery of a nation (Ibid.). 
National identities hence develop not from something pre-existing in communities, 
but are based on “invented traditions” and symbols created by elite groups of a society. 
                                                                                                                                            
“Indigenization” could refer to the aborigines, the indigenous population of Taiwan; and the term 
“nativization” is too vague (Jacobs, 2000, p.18).  
 
3
 Dafydd Fell’s seminal study on party change in Taiwan has shown how parties have moderated their 
polarized stances in response to public opinion and election results (Fell, 2005, p. 128). 
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“ 'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, …. of a ritual or symbolic 
nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, 
which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawn, 1983, p. 1). Yet, 
only those traditions are successful which are “broadcast on a wavelength to which 
the public was already to tune in” (Ibid.,  p. 263).  
 
Anthony D. Smith adopts a “middle-ground approach” (Cerulo, 1997, p. 390) as he 
creates a linkage between social constructivism and essentialist views when arguing 
that a nation possesses certain “fundamental features”. These fundamental features 
can be found in his definition of a nation as a “named population sharing an historic 
territory, common myths and historic memories, a mass, public culture, a common 
economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991, p. 14). 
Central to his “ethno-symbolic approach” is the concept of an ethnic core or ethnic 
community, representing a dominant group of people, which is able to incorporate 
other “ethnics” to its created state via annexation or attraction (Ibid., p. 39). This 
indicates that national identity is at the same time a product of “ancient” ethnic 
identity as well as of deliberate manipulation through ideology, commemoration and 
symbolism
4
 (Cerulo, 1997, p. 390). Through its relationship with the ethnic belonging 
of a human being, national identity hence represents the political form of an ethnic 
identity (Schubert, 2004, p. 536).  
 
The most influential dichotomy in the understanding of national identity is that of 
Western/political/civic identity versus Eastern/ethnic/cultural identity. Anthony D. 
Smith gives an elaborate definition when he argues that the Western or civic model 
entails a historic territory, a legal-political community, legal-political equality of 
members, articulation in a set of rights and duties, as well as a common civic culture 
and ideology. On the other hand, the emphasis of the non-Western concept is on a 
community of birth and native culture (Smith, 1991, p. 11). According to Smith “[t]he 
nation is seen as a fictive ‘super-family’. …. Genealogy and presumed descent ties, 
popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions: these are the 
elements of an alternative, ethnic conception of the nation .…” (Ibid., p. 12). However 
he also acknowledges that most states and nations contain both “civic and ethnic 
elements in varying degrees and different forms” (Ibid., p. 13). Nevertheless he 
believes that the civic/ethnic division “remains valid and useful” (Ibid., p. 81).  
 
Stephen Shulman argues that civic identity can be understood as rationalistic and 
voluntary, its components
5
 being external to the individual; while cultural and ethnic 
components are internal. The direct connection to a person’s physical and 
psychological structure by language, ancestry, race, traditions and religion hence 
accounts for the intense emotional attachment to ethnic national communities 
(Shulman, 2002, p. 580). This finding has direct consequences for state and party 
policies. State policies aimed at constructing a national identity could use symbolic 
and educational measures which stress the ethnic and cultural components of identity 
                                                 
4
 This concurs with John Hutchington’s ideas of cultural nationalism. Although a modern 
phenomenon, he argues that its national symbols, memories and cultural practices chosen, aim at 
resurrecting or awakening existing historic memories of a community (Hutchinson, 1987, p. 20 ff).  
 
5
 Shulman’s study on civic/ethnic nationalism and identity in Europe concludes that the 
strength of cultural components of national identity in Western European countries is based on the fact 
that civic components alone can not provide sufficient unity in a state (Shulman, 2002, p. 580.)  
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in order to achieve a strong emotional attachment to the nation. Consequently political 
parties that seek electoral success would equally focus on the emotional area of 
identity components. Post-Cold War political developments in the former republics of 
the Soviet Union and the Balkans, as well as right-wing populist parties in West 
Europe, appear to support these conclusions.  However, the theories mentioned 
provide little insight on the question of shifts from emphasizing one identity 
component to emphasizing another. Governments may maneuver from putting 
emphasis on civic to ethnic components (e.g. former Yugoslavia) or vice versa (post-
Second World War Germany); and small political parties change their stance one way 
or the other. However, fundamental movements between these identity components 
by dominant catch-all parties seem to be rare. The case of former state-party KMT in 
Taiwan could illustrate such a shift, that of moving away  from the ideal of a civic-
based “New Taiwanese” identity, and moving toward an emphasis on ethnic 
components of Taiwan identity. An election campaign analysis would provide an 
understanding of the instruments and strategies involved, as well as the difficulties 
and the general feasibility of such a project.  
 
EVOLUTION OF TAIWAN IDENTITY 
 
The study of Taiwan national identity offers a prime example of the multi-faceted 
definitions of identities and the different approaches and concepts to explain or justify 
them.  
The roots of Taiwan national identity are closely related to the history of the island. 
Colonized by the Dutch (1624-1661), Taiwan was a refuge for Ming Dynasty loyalist 
General Koxinga (鄭成功) from 1661-1683, before it was conquered by the Qing 
Empire in 1683. Han-Chinese colonizers began to settle down in the plains, while the 
mountains were controlled by Austronesians, who had arrived in Taiwan several 
thousand years earlier. Taiwan was ceded to the Japanese after the Sino-Japanese war 
in the Treaty of Shimoseki 1895. The colonizers treated the inhabitants of Taiwan 
largely as second-class citizens, yet rapid modernization and substantial 
improvements in living conditions initially laid grounds for a positive identification 
with the island (Chang, 2000, p. 55). After 1945 the administration of the island was 
handed to the Republic of China, and the arriving KMT troops were welcomed as 
liberators (Cabestan, 2005, p. 32 ff). However, the new administrator used Taiwan’s 
wealth to rebuild the Chinese mainland; moreover, their rule was plagued with 
incompetence, corruption and distrust of the former Japanese citizens (Philips, 2007, p. 
282). 
 
On February 28, 1947 the looming conflict between the KMT government and the 
Taiwanese resulted in an uprising. The regime brutally retaliated and the crackdown 
eliminated or silenced most of Taiwan’s intellectual elite. This “February 28 Incident” 
(二二八事件) marked the affirmation of a unique Taiwanese identity and created a 
demand for autonomy and democracy (Chu and Lin, 2001, p. 123). After the KMT 
lost the Civil War in China, Chiang Kai-shek (將中正) retreated to Taiwan, together 
with approximately 1.5 million people from the administrative, army and business 
sectors.  
 With the support of the USA for the strategically important island, Taiwan was 
developed by the KMT into a “model province” for China, making rapid economic 
progress over the next decades. At the same time however a sub-ethnic cleavage 
emerged, between those newly arrived from the Chinese mainland and the Taiwanese 
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- Han-Chinese who had been living in Taiwan for several centuries before 1945.
6
 For 
several decades the Taiwanese were completely excluded from political participation 
and power in the higher levels of institutions. Local culture and language
7
 were 
suppressed, as the KMT propagated its official “great China” nationalism (Schubert, 
1999, p. 54), Taiwan was a natural part of the Chinese nation, the latter primarily 
defined in ethnical and cultural terms.
8
 When Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), son of 
Chiang Kai-shek, became prime minister in 1972, he began the Taiwanization of the 
administration and cautious political liberalization (Cabestan, 2005, p. 35). Taiwanese 
national identity became more prominent and was expressed in literately circles like 
the Taiwanization movement (本土運動) and in native (鄉土) literature, both closely 
linked to the established political opposition, which called for democracy and 
participation (Hsiau, 2000, p. 91).   
 
DISCOURSES OF TAIWAN NATIONALISM 
 
Schubert (1999) divides the discussion on Taiwanese identity into three basic 
discourses: 
The discourse of Taiwanese ethno-cultural nationalism argues that Taiwan identity is 
based on specific historic experiences and perceived cultural differences of the 
Taiwan people. The colonial past of the island – especially the Japanese rule – and its 
long separation from the Chinese mainland, are emphasized; these set it apart from 
Chinese nationalism and created a unique community sharing a common fate under 
the permanent threat of an antagonist China (Schubert 1999, p. 55).  
Taiwanese culture is envisioned as a mixture of Western, Chinese and Austronesian 
influences. It is further argued that Taiwanese are ethnically different from Han-
Chinese on the mainland. Centuries of inter-marriages between Chinese and 
aborigines resulted in a unique genetic make-up (Hsueh et al., 2005, p. 84 ff.). This 
ethnic and culture-based identity is fused with the memory of the suffering of the 
Taiwanese under the KMT’s rule; it creates a powerful narrative of a Taiwanese 
identity that excludes the mainlanders.  
 
In the discourse of the multi-ethnic nationalism approach, the Taiwanese nation is 
conceptualized as a harmonious, democratic and tolerant nation composed of four 
ethnic groups: mainlanders, Hoklo, Hakka, and aborigines. The concept considers 
ethnicity as an essential part of human identity formation, even as it asserts its fluidity 
(Schubert, 1999, p. 59). It thus departs from pure perennialism and invites ideas of 
constructivism. Some advocates of this approach aim at achieving a trans-ethnic 
                                                 
6
 Taiwanese (本省人 or 本地人) represent close to 87% of the population, mainlanders (外省
人) about 12%. Taiwanese include people from southern Fujian (福建), Minan and Hoklo (閩南 and 福
佬 ) which make up approximately 77%; and Hakka (客家 ) from southern Guandong (關東 ), 
representing roughly 10% of the population. The mainlanders are the immigrants who arrived in 
Taiwan after 1945 and their descendents (Ho and Liu, 2003, p. 155 ff.).  Currently about 400.000 
Taiwanese aborigines (原住民) have resituated in Taiwan, the only group of non-Han ethnic origin; 
they account for 2% of the total population and can be divided into several distinct ethnic groups 
themselves (Allio, 2000, p. 46).  
 
7
 Taiwanese is a variant of the Minan (閩南) dialect, commonly referred to as Taiyu (台語). 
 
8
 In this aspect, not only the Chinese nationalisms of the Communist party in China and the 
Nationalist Party on Taiwan, but also the radical ethno-cultural Taiwan nationalism have much in 
common. For a more detailed analysis of Chinese nationalism see Hughes (2006).  
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identity, based on citizenship and memory of a common history, hence leading 
towards the idea of a civic nationalism (Schubert, 2004, p. 30).  
 
According to the discourse of political or state nationalism, the foundation of a 
Taiwan nation is in line with the institutions of a liberal state. Therefore people might 
still define themselves as culturally or ethnically Chinese. This however, has no 
implications on the relationship with China or on the question of political unification 
(Schubert, 1999, p. 63). This idea of civic nationalism is very prominent in the 
academic community; it views the rise of Taiwan identity as it is directly connected to 
its geographical and political separation from China and subsequent democratic 
development (Cabestan, 2005; Liu, 2002; Schubert, 2004). Ernest Gellner states that 
as a political principle, nationalism always aims at achieving a harmony of nation and 
state entity (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). Schubert argues that this nation-state “figures as the 
institutional fulfillment of a community’s quest for national identity”, which leads 
him to the observation that “Taiwanese national identity must be regarded . . . as state 
identity” (Schubert, 2004, p. 536 ff.). 
These three types of discourse on Taiwan identity had different impacts on the 
policies of the Taiwan government since the 1970s. As the issue of Taiwan identity is 
at the center of Taiwanization, the content of these policies reflects the visions of 
Taiwan nationalism of the governments in power.  
 
POLICIES OF TAIWANIZATION 
 
The issues of Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwanese identity have been part of 
Taiwan politics since the 1970s. The visions of governments on this are varied, but 
the essential ideas propagated through their policies have remained the same. 
Taiwanization can be understood as a two-layered Taiwan-centered approach to 
politics; it aims at achieving political and cultural equality of Taiwanese, domestically 
vis-à-vis the ruling mainlanders, and the KMT brand of Chinese nationalism. 
Internationally it seeks to raise the prominence of Taiwan and to increase its 
international maneuvering space in opposition to the People’s Republic of China.  
 
Taiwanization was instrumental in creating a Taiwan identity with civic and ethnic 
elements. Policy measures undertaken to achieve this can be divided into: 
 
1. The political realm – measures that include: the democratization of Taiwan’s 
institutions; the push for membership in international organizations; and the 
strengthening of the country’s sovereignty in opposition to China (civic 
identity);  
2. The cultural realm – measures that raise the prominence of Taiwanese culture, 
history and languages; while at the same time reducing the symbolism of 
KMT Chinese nationalism (ethnic identity); 
 
The reforms undertaken by Chiang Ching-kuo in the early 1970s were a reaction to 
the consequent international isolation after the ROC lost its UN membership. This 
undermined the domestic legitimization of the KMT’s ideology of the ROC 
representing the whole China. Therefore measures included opening the party and 
administration to younger and able Taiwanese, and focusing more on local culture. In 
1981 the Council for Cultural Affairs (文化建設委員會) was set up to promote 
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Taiwan’s cultural development (Chang, 2006, p. 189). However these first steps 
towards Taiwanization were tools aimed at securing the dominance of the KMT rule.  
 
Chiang Ching-kuo’s successor, the Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui (李登煇), introduced 
political changes that began democratization and, through majority rule, 
Taiwanization. In 1991 the first free national elections in Taiwan for the National 
Assembly and in 1992, the Legislative Yuan elections both resulted in very good 
results for the KMT, strengthening Lee’s Mainstream Faction in the party. 9  This 
consisted mostly, of Taiwanese and younger, more democratic and liberal-minded 
mainlanders; while the Anti-Mainstream Faction was supported by the older, 
conservative mainlander elite. 
In this process of democratization the old mainland elite of the KMT was 
continuously weakened, while Lee consolidated his position (Tsai, 2005, p. 188). A 
more open discussion of the national question was one result (Jacobs, 2000, p. 36). 
The transition process came to a successful ending with Lee Teng-hui’s victory in the 
first direct Presidential election in 1996.
10
 Lee continued his domestic reforms; at the 
same time he pursued a foreign policy (flexible diplomacy) designed to raise 
Taiwan’s international status (Tsai, 2005, p. 194), thus moving away from the One-
China principle.
11
 The result of Taiwanization in the political sphere was the 
increasing identification of Taiwanese people with the state and its institutions.  
 
The cultural Taiwanization further enhanced this feeling of belonging to Taiwan. The 
state underwent a transformation from a “cultural agent of Chinese nationalism to a 
powerful agent of Taiwanese identity” (Chu, 2004, p. 499). The government began to 
set up research institutes and museums on the island’s culture and history, and to 
support native literature and the performing arts, without fully abandoning its China-
centered position (Chang, 2004, p. 40). An important step in Taiwanization was taken 
in 1997, with the new junior high school curriculum “Getting to Know Taiwan” (認識
臺灣), which focused on the distinctive nature of Taiwan history, geography and 
society and gave “an impulse to the notion of pluralistic national identity and national 
identification” (Corcuff, 2002, p.160).  
 
With Taiwanization, the KMT reacted to opposition pressure, hijacked the discourse 
and stayed in power, while Lee Teng-hui himself strengthened his position. As a 
Taiwanese, Lee wanted to break with the country’s authoritarian past and converted 
transcend the old Republic of China into the ROC on Taiwan; he publicly apologized 
for the crimes of the KMT, (e.g. the February 28 Incident). Together with democratic 
practice, it led the way to a possible political re-socialization of the Taiwanese (Chao 
and Dickson, 2002, p. 5). Lee promoted the concept of the “New Taiwanese”. It had 
                                                 
9
 In the first free parliamentary election in Taiwan, the KMT gained 64% of the seats; while 
the opposition DPP got 31%. At the same time the ratio of mainlanders in the legislature dropped from 
60% down to 22% after the election (Nathan, 1993, p. 435 ff).  
 
10
 Lee Teng-hui won this election with 54% of the votes; while the DPP candidate Peng Ming-
min received 33% (Hsieh and Niou, 1996, p. 545). 
 
11
 Examples were the 1995 travel to his alma mater Cornell University in the USA (Ibid., p. 
197); and the 1999 so-called “special state-to-state” relationship between Taiwan and China. The 
foreign policy responded to a hostile China, particularly after Peking’s heartless response to the 1994 
murder of many Taiwanese tourists in China, and the 1996 missile tests in the Taiwan Strait by the 
mainland (Jacobs, 2000, p. 36).  
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appeared as a slogan of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP 民進黨) in 
1992, calling for ethnic harmony (Fell, 2005, p. 114); and it was later used by KMT 
candidate James Soong (宋楚瑜) when he ran for governor of Taiwan province in 
1995 (Wong, 2004, p. 50). It was widely recognized when Lee used it to support Ma 
Ying-jeou in the 1998 Taipei mayoral race.
12
 The concept promoted a civic 
Taiwanese identity and focused on the unity of all people living on the island, on 
inclusiveness, consensus and identification with Taiwan and its future.
13
 People’s 
ethnic background or time of arrival did not matter, as everybody shared the 
experience of living in Taiwan and was committed to it (Bedford and Hwang, 2006, p. 
83).  
 
In 2000, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) won the presidential elections, 
campaigning on the strength of his ethnic background as a Taiwanese. Taiwanization 
entered the next stage. In the international arena Chen could gain early success with 
the country’s accession into the WTO next to China in 2001. Further efforts to widen 
Taiwan’s international presence (i.e. bids for WHO and UN membership) were, 
however, met with strong opposition by the PRC. The policy towards China under 
Chen’s presidency could be best described as inconstant, ranging from good will 
gestures and proposals for closer economic cooperation
14
 to the “one country on each 
side” (一邊一國) statement of 2002 (Schubert, 2007, p. 10). In the domestic realm 
Chen implemented further democratic reforms,   established a referendum law, and 
continued breaking the links of state and military institutions to the KMT.  
The more obvious changes, however, were made in the cultural sphere. As the mayor 
of Taipei, Chen had overseen important symbolic Taiwanization policies, such as the 
removal of Chiang Kai-shek statues and portraits, the renaming of the Chieh-shou 
Road (介壽路) 15, and the opening of a museum devoted to the 228 Incident (Liu et al., 
2005, p. 106).  
This “spiritual homeland” was constructed by promoting tourism in Taiwan, 
Taiwanese literature and the new academic discipline of “Taiwan studies”. In 2001 
the compulsory subject “Native Language16” (鄉土語言 ) was introduced in 
elementary schools; and a new high school curriculum was introduced, which 
prioritized Taiwan history over that of China and world history.  
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 Corcuff describes the event at the rally as follows: “Lee Teng-hui asked in Taiwanese, ‘Ma 
Ying-jeou, where do you come from?’ Ma replied, ‘I am a new Taiwanese, who grew up drinking 
Taiwan water and eating Taiwan rice, a true Taipei man born in Wanhua District’ ” (Corcuff, 2002, 
p.187). 
 
13
 According to Fell, Lee Teng-hui described the concept of New Taiwanese in these terms: 
“No matter if you came 400 or 500 years ago, or 40 or 50 years ago from the mainland, or if an 
aboriginal, we are all Taiwanese, so long as we all work hard for Taiwan and the ROC, then we are 
New Taiwanese” (不論是四, 五百年前來的, 或是四十年, 五十年前從大陸來的, 或是原住民, 攏是
咱們台灣人, 爲台灣, 為中華民國在這裡打平, 就是新台灣人.) (United Daily News, 3 December 
1998, p. 5, quoted in Fell, 2005, p. 114). 
 
14
 For example the establishment of the “three mini-links” direct connections to China from 
Kinmen (金門 ) and Matsu (馬組 ); and direct flights to the Chinese mainland for Taiwanese 
businessmen during Chinese New Year (Ibid.,  p. 8).  
 
15
 Chieh-shou Road (介壽路) was changed into Ketagalan Boulevard (凱達格蘭大道 ). 
“Chieh-shou” literary means “Long live Chiang Kai-shek”; while “Ketagalan” refers to the Taiwanese 
aborigines originally living in the capitals area (Pan, 2000, p. 86).  
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Symbolic changes were also undertaken, such as adding the English word 
“TAIWAN” to the cover of all Taiwanese passports in 2003 (Chang, 2004, p. 41 ff.). 
These changes accelerated in the last two years of Chen’s term. The administration 
began a wide campaign of renaming public places, state-owned companies and 
buildings, replacing “China” with “Taiwan”. Prominent examples were the change 
from “Chinese Petroleum Corp. (中國石油)” to “CPC Corp., Taiwan (台灣中油)”; 
and from “Chunghwa Post (中華郵政)” to “Taiwan Post (臺灣郵政)” in 2007 (Shan 
et al., 2007, p. 1). In September 2006 Chiang Kai-shek International Airport (中正國
際機場) was renamed “Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport (臺灣桃園國際機
場)“ (Executive Yuan announcement, 2006).  
The name changes were met with opposition not only by the KMT, but also by some 
of the employees of these companies. The name change of the Chiang Kai-shek 
Memorial Hall (國立中正紀念堂) into “Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall (台灣民
主紀念館)” received the most attention (Li, 2007, p. A15).  
 
Comparing the cultural policies of the KMT with that of the DPP, one can note that 
the former was still linked to its Chinese roots; while the latter focused solely on 
Taiwanese-ness and tried “to create a new spiritual homeland” (Chang, 2004, p. 39; 
Chang, 2006, p. 202). The rapid and forceful Taiwanization under Chen Shui-bian 
could be described as a process of De-Sinization, as cultural and symbolic ties to 
China and Chinese nationalism of the authoritarian era were cut and replaced by 
Taiwan centrism (Chang, 2004, p. 44). Theoretically the primarily civic concept of 
“New Taiwanese” was still rooted in all three basic discourses of Taiwanese identity; 
it contained elements of ethno-cultural (e.g. common history), multi-ethnic to state 
nationalism (e.g. democratic values and system). Under the Chen administration the 
ethno-cultural discourse dominated, marking a shift towards an emphasis on the 
ethnic content of Taiwan identity.  
 
TAIWANIZATION IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
 
In Taiwan elections the identity question has played a crucial role as parties use this 
issue to position themselves and attract votes. From the time of the Taiwanization 
policies of Lee Teng-hui and later, of Chen Shui-bian, a Taiwan centered 
consciousness and a Taiwan identity has become a mainstream consensus. The DPP 
appeals to just one identity; the KMT on the other hand, as a catch-all party, must 
constantly maneuver between its mainlander and Taiwanese constituencies. It takes a 
center position with regard to the identity question. After the departure of Lee Teng-
hui in 2000, the KMT adjusted its position several times. Under the chairmanship of 
Lien Chan (蓮戰 ) (2000-2005) the party initially returned to ROC Chinese 
nationalism, which was dropped during Lee Teng-hui’ s second term. In 2000 the 
national flag and other national symbols were heavily used to attract traditional KMT 
supporters (Fell, 2005, p. 115).  
Having said that, Taiwan nationalism has also become an increasingly important issue 
in campaigns. This can be seen with Lien who used it in 2000 to attack his rival James 
Soong, who was born in China to Chinese parents, for not being a true Taiwanese. 
(Bedford and Hwang, 2006, p. 100). Trends towards Taiwanese nationalism became 
stronger after the defeat of the KMT in 2000. The party then combined Chinese and 
Taiwan identity symbols and imagery, thus appealing to the double identity of many 
voters and promoting ethnic reconciliation (Fell, 2006, p. 30; Fell, 2007, p. 28). It 
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largely adhered to the “New Taiwanese” principles. Taiwanization of the KMT 
became apparent in the 2004 presidential elections, where a stronger emphasis was 
placed on ethnic Taiwan identity. Lien Chan and his vice-presidential candidate James 
Soong were both regarded as mainlanders. They put great emphasis on their Taiwan 
identity and tried to show their love for Taiwan.
16
 Despite all of the KMT’s efforts to 
embrace Taiwanization, the party still lost by a narrow margin. Many voters did not 
believe the Taiwanese image projected by Lien and Soong, as they were still regarded 
as parts of the old mainland elite of the party.  
 
MA YING JEOU’S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
 
The 2008 Presidential election was held two months after the KMT had won a 
substantial victory by securing a three-fourth majority in the legislature. The results 
reflected a general dissatisfaction with the DPP government, particularly with the 
perceived dire state of the economy
17
 and a series of corruption scandals that involved 
high-ranking DPP officials and the circle surrounding the President.  
In light of this pre-election situation, Ma was considered to be the favorite against the 
DPP candidate, the former Kaohsiung mayor and premier Hsieh Chang-ting (謝長廷). 
Ma was very popular and the media was exceptionally friendly to him. During his 
time as a minister of justice and Taipei mayor, he had managed to build up the image 
of a modest, hard-working and “clean” politician. Uncertainty, however, remained 
regarding the issue of his identity. In the past two elections this had been decisive for 
the victory of the DPP. He was born to mainland Chinese parents in Hong Kong and 
had held important political positions during the authoritarian era, issues raised by the 
DPP campaign which questioned his loyalty to Taiwan.
18
 An important aim of his 
campaign was therefore to portray himself and the party he represented as truly 
Taiwanese, focusing on the well-being of the country and defending its sovereignty. 
In general the campaign platform tried to strike a balance between Taiwan-centered 
consciousness and the Chinese identity of the party. This was particularly challenging, 
as he vigorously promoted improvement of cross-strait relations, identifying China as 
the key to Taiwan’s economic recovery. Ma tried to assure voters of his commitment 
to the sovereignty of Taiwan
19
, with the “three no’s” formula (no unification, no 
independence, no armed conflict) regarding relations with China (Rigger, 2008, p. 
692). In light of the difficulties Ma was facing regarding his own and the party’s 
identity and the interests of the nation, the concept of “New Taiwanese” was a means 
of amalgamating these diverging interests. The election campaign showed the 
adaptation of the concept through strategies and instruments.  
 
                                                 
16
 One of the most famous events of the 2004 election saw Lien and his wife, together with the 
KMT secretary general, kneeling down and kissing the ground (Wong, 2004, p. 50), gestures repeated 
by Soong and his wife. The event was then marketed in the election advertisements of the KMT. 
 
17
 The economic indicators were, comparatively speaking, good, with 5.7 percent growth and 
3.9 percent unemployment in 2007; but the middle class had experienced long-term wage stagnation 
and reduced purchasing power (Muyard, 2008, p. 82). 
18
 The DPP claimed that Ma possessed a valid US green card and that his two daughters 
possessed US passports (Bruyas, 2008, p. 1).  
 
19
 Ma further underlined his firm position vis-à-vis China when he strongly condemned the 
Chinese crackdown in Tibet in March 2008. In his statement he even considered a boycott of the 2008 
Peking Olympic Games (Ma Statement, 2008). 
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Election Platform 
At the center of Ma’s election platform was the economy, i.e. how Taiwan’s 
international status should be raised to that of being an international economic centre 
in the Asia-Pacific region. The key element of his proposals were the so-called “633 
objectives,” raising annual economic growth to 6%, raising per capita GDP to at least 
US$ 30,000, and reducing the unemployment rate to less than 3% (Ma Platform 
Presentation, 2008). 
 In order to achieve these ambitious goals, he emphasized the importance of closer 
relations and increased interaction with China, through direct transportation links, so 
as to allow great numbers of Chinese tourists into Taiwan and the so-called “cross-
Strait common market” (兩岸共同經濟基金). Taiwan was heralded as a role model 
for democratic development; but democracy under Chen Shui-bian had become a 
mere pro forma electoral democracy, unjust, corrupt and disrespectful of 
constitutionalism (Ma and Siew, 2008b). Ma promised new governance ethics and an 
end to corruption. He emphasized the rights of different ethnic groups (e.g. Hakka, 
Hoklo), and proposed a variety of measures to help the aborigines, promising more 
financial support and the protection of their traditions. In his platform Ma Ying-jeou 
portrayed himself and the party as true protectors of a free, democratic and multi-
ethnic Taiwan (Ma and Siew, 2008a).  
Through proposals on culture policy, the KMT’s balancing act between its Chinese 
heritage and the Taiwanized reality became obvious, promoting Taiwanese culture, 
while at the same time stressing the islands Chineseness. He pledged to spend more 
money on cultural projects and Taiwanese arts and science, to create new domestic 
and international brands, and to set-up various cultural centers and foundations (e.g. 
Taiwan Film Center, Taiwanese Public Broadcasting Center). Taiwan’s Chinese 
culture was highlighted in his dream of a Taiwanese Nobel Prize for the Chinese 
world (華人世界). According to Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s culture is a bridge for better 
cross-strait relations. Culture instead of politics should play the main role. Through 
knowledge and academic exchange people on both sides could develop mutual trust 
and respect. Limitations for investments and tourism from the mainland should be 
reduced. Cultural and artistic exchange across the Strait was to be intensified and a 
dictionary in traditional and simplified Chinese characters, to be created, facilitating 
communication between Taiwan and China (Ma and Siew, 2008c).  
 
Election Strategy  
The experience and capabilities of the KMT in the economic area was the main theme 
of the campaign. It was accompanied by a call for change in government and an end 
to corruption. The Nationalist Party portrayed itself as a party of all Taiwan people, 
using the concept of “New Taiwanese”. In the 2008 KMT campaign negative 
campaigning was largely absent. This marked a stark contrast to the 2004 campaign in 
which personal attacks on Chen Shui-bian had reached worrisome dimensions 
(Schafferer 2006, p. 49). The campaign used a wide range of methods to communicate 
its message, ranging from billboards, posters and banners, campaign bills, leaflets and 
brochures to newspaper and television advertisement.  
 
Campaign Advertisement 
Designs on public campaign advertisements were very specialized; posters, billboards, 
banners or advertisement on busses and taxis included often relevant (economic) 
messages for specific geographic areas. In Pingtung county (屏東縣) billboards gave 
detailed information on the advantages to farmers of the “cross-Strait common 
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market
20”. In Taichung city (台中市) infrastructure projects were promised21; and in 
Kaohsiung city (高雄市) the local airport would benefit from direct links to China.22 
The “New Taiwanese” image of the party and its position between the poles of 
Taiwanization and ROC heritage were encapsulated in a banner at the Taipei KMT 
campaign headquarters. Covering thirteen storeys, the banner showed Ma and his 
vice-presidential candidate Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) standing above a crowd of women 
and children from all walks of life, with three aborigines prominently positioned next 
to the candidates. Above the candidates were the blue sky and the campaign slogan of 
the KMT “Taiwan moves forward – Taiwan must win” (台灣向前行 台灣一定贏). 
To the left of the banner, there was a ROC flag.
23
   
 
 
Newspapers and Campaign Material 
Newspaper advertisements focused on linking Hsieh Chang-ting to the unpopular 
Chen administration, the corruption of the DPP, as well as to economic issues and 
promised change. In campaign literature and promotion material, similar topics 
dominated.  However there was one other important theme – identity. Ma assumed 
roles at both ends of the spectrum of a New Taiwanese identity. He was frequently 
portrayed in traditional aborigine outfit and as a true friend of their culture and their 
cause, demonstrated by names some tribes had given in their native language. He was 
also shown as a sportive, young, modern and international leader. In a leaflet he 
appeared together with several young professionals in their thirties, such as Internet 
entrepreneurs or the US-born Taiwanese singer Wang Lee-Hom (王力宏). A postcard 
for Chinese New Year pictured him running next to a tiger, symbolizing his strength 
and also his year of birth according to the Chinese zodiac. The design of the postcard 
included various references to traditional Chinese culture and the Republic of China, 
with its blue colors referencing the blue part of the ROC flag and the Presidential 
Palace as a backdrop. In the KMT Taipei campaign headquarters, a set of four 
postcards was distributed that showed only the ROC flag and the signature “I love 
ROC”, the reverse side featured scenes from the Chiang Ching-kuo era.  
 
Campaign Rallies 
The identity issue and the goal of the KMT to cater to the entire range of voters 
became evident in various campaign rallies and events. The Nationalist Party 
presented itself as a truly Taiwanese party, yet ROC symbols like the national flag, 
were omnipresent. The style and progression of rallies had adopted many ingredients 
of past DPP rallies (Schafferer, 2006, p. 50). To create a passionate experience for the 
participants and stir up emotions, songs were sung, dances and other acts performed. 
In the south of Taiwan the events were held mostly in Taiwanese (less than 20 percent 
of the announcements were made in Mandarin); while in the north a more equal 
mixture of Mandarin and Taiwanese was used. In Kaohsiung City the central 
campaign rally a week before the election included songs and dances by aborigine 
                                                 
20
 Billboard at motorway near Neipu (内鋪), Pingtung county. (The author’s observation on 
March 17, 2008). 
 
21
 Billboard next to Taichung central station. (The author’s observation on March 18, 2008).  
 
22
 Billboard on Wu-Fu Road (五福路). (The author’s observation on March 16, 2008). 
 
23
 The author’s observation on March 20, 2008. 
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groups.
24
  During a rally in Taoyuan City (桃園市 ) a day before the election, 
Mandarin and Taiwanese songs were performed
25
 and at the central event of the 
Overseas Chinese, in Taipei (台北市), the national anthem and national flag anthem 
were sung, followed by other classic Chinese songs.
26
  
 
Television Advertisement 
The double identity of the KMT was less apparent in television advertisements. Clips 
either promoted Ma’s economic proposals or called for a change of government. The 
only identity promoted was the Taiwanese identity of the candidate. Even in 
commercials with economic content, signs of Taiwanization were clearly visible. 
These signs were the use of all three major languages, Taiwanese, Mandarin, and 
Hakka; and frequent reference to the landscape of Taiwan and important scenic spots 
that conveyed a feeling of belonging to the island. 
One of the most prominent examples of these “Taiwanized” spots was “The strength 
to change” (改變的力量).  The spot featured KMT county heads and city mayors 
reporting for duty and stating that they were prepared, and that the time was ready for 
change; they spoke in all three languages. The clip showed images of running horses 
on a beach at dawn, Taiwanese landscape, important places and structures. On the 
whole, it evoked a feeling of readiness while closely linking the party to Taiwan and 
its development.  
Music was an important element in a clip on social policies. It showed Ma Ying-jeou 
jogging with others, while featuring two lines from the Taiwanese song “Move 
forward” (向前走) by Liem Giong (林強), one of the most famous Taiwanese singers. 
The lyrics of this classic song from the early 1990s were “[Whatever comes don’t be 
surprised] I fear nothing” 啥物攏不驚 and “[Move forward] Keep running” (向前走). 
The television advertisement “Our Taiwan – our home” (咱的台灣 咱的家) was a 
model case of Taiwanization and the catch-all “New Taiwanese” identity promoted by 
Ma during the 2008 election campaign. The video featured two classic clusters of 
images associated with Taiwan as a homeland. The islands landscape, in this case the 
Taiwan Mountains with tree trunks on green hills surrounded by clouds; and the small 
country village with children playing and people happily working in natural 
surroundings, drinking tea. In the clip, several famous Taiwanese and Chinese food 
was shown, like the famous Chinese pink wedding cakes.  The variety of the islands 
culture was demonstrated by featuring Chinese opera, as well as aboriginal traditions 
and various temples. A group of young people was shown sitting happily together, 
talking and drinking tea, representing different ethnic groups. Ma Ying-jeou casually 
ran towards the group, joined them and together they wrote a Chinese New Year 
banner which included the phrase “All come together” (大家做伙來). The song ended 
with the slogan “Work together for a new Taiwan” (攜手同心奔向新台灣). The 
image of unity and harmony was further enhanced by the song accompanying the 
video. The “Happy reunion song” (歡聚歌) by the band New Formosa (新寶島康樂
隊) is a classic song from the 1990s, which is sung in three languages, Taiwanese, 
Hakka and an aboriginal language. Its lyrics state that ethnic backgrounds do not 
                                                 
24
 The author’s observation on March 16, 2008. 
 
25
 The author’s observation on March 20, 2008. 
 
26
 All songs were performed by famous Taiwanese singers. (The author’s observation on 
March 20, 2008). 
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matter and people should be happy together and not divided. This advertisement 
clearly demonstrated the quintessence of Ma’s “New Taiwanese” identity.  
 
Ma Ying-jeou’s central campaign message with regard to identity and Taiwanization 
appeared to be largely in line with the original concept of “New Taiwanese” – a 
Taiwan identity defined in civic rather than in ethnic terms (Rigger, 2008, p. 697). A 
closer analysis however, revealed that this concept was filled with a strong Taiwanese 
cultural underpinning, going far beyond that of previous campaigns of the KMT. 
Interestingly enough, the strongest emphasis on the ethnic content of the Taiwan 
identity could be observed during campaign rallies and in television advertisements. 
Clearly the goal of these election instruments was to create an emotional response 
from potential voters. The powerful Taiwanese undertone was further enhanced by 
Ma’s frequent attempts to speak Taiwanese, as a key factor of ethnicity in Taiwan is 
the use of the language (Lee, 2005, p. 15).
27
 Ma also tried to connect with the grass-
roots during his so-called “long stay” visits, where he worked for a day with farmers, 
fishermen or country-side factory workers (Pearl Report, 2008). Within the concept 
of the “New Taiwanese”, the Taiwanese culture and Hoklo language were strongly 
emphasized, creating a “culturally recharged” concept of “New Taiwanese” for the 
2008 election campaign.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The emergence of a “culturally recharged” “New Taiwanese” can be directly 
attributed to the impact of two decades of Taiwanization policies by Taiwan 
governments. Taiwanization is a project aimed at creating identity in civic and ethnic 
or cultural terms. In this period Taiwanization and the definition of Taiwan identity 
evolved from a mainly civic-based approach to a more cultural and ethnic approach. 
De-Sinization under Chen Shui-bian and the election campaigns of 2000 and 2004 
have forced the KMT to appear very Taiwanized so as to successfully gain 
mainstream support. The KMT’s “New Taiwanese” concept fitted well in the earlier 
era of Taiwanization, but it had to be adapted to effects of the cultural policies of the 
Chen administration. This analysis has also highlighted the importance of discourses 
on culture and ethnicity for the creation of an identity. It also shows the different 
dimensions of Taiwan identity, which are apparent in the political and cultural spheres 
of Taiwanization.  
In his campaign Ma Ying-jeou had to demonstrate his Taiwan identity in ethnic and 
civic terms; or in other words, in the political and cultural spheres framed through 
Taiwanization. Since the Taiwan identity is currently more culture-based than it was 
at the beginning of the democratization process, this forced Ma to adopt a strong 
Taiwanese image during the campaign. Symbols of ethnic identity were particularly 
present in campaign instruments that aimed at creating a positive emotional reaction 
in potential voters, and creating their attachment to the candidate and the party. 
Theoretically the case has shown that a shift towards a stronger emphasis on the 
ethnic component of identity is possible and can be accepted if it is perceived as an 
authentic development and is in concurrence with the general opinion. Nevertheless 
the KMT continued catering to other ethnic groups and identities besides the 
Taiwanese, and did uphold the “New Taiwanese” concept. Yet, the difficulties for the 
KMT as a catch-all party are nevertheless obvious and can be identified in the election 
                                                 
27
 The other one being the time of immigration to Taiwan, i.e. before or after 1945 (Ibid.). 
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platform of Ma, with its inherent conflict between Taiwan identity and relations with 
China.  
This conflict can not yet be solved by the new administration and within only a few 
months after his inauguration, Ma Ying-jeou has already been accused of betraying 
Taiwan and violating two core principles of Taiwanization – politically, the 
strengthening of Taiwan’s sovereignty in opposition to China and focus on its 
democratic development; and culturally, the consolidation of Taiwan identity. In 
cultural terms, Ma has returned in many ways to KMT Chinese Nationalism
28
 by, for 
example publicly stating that the Republic of China includes the Chinese mainland 
(Ko, 2008, p. 2) and stressing Chinese ethnic and cultural heritage.
29
 At the same time 
many Taiwanese feel that he has been politically weak towards China, thus hurting 
the country’s sovereignty30 and endangering their personal safety. They have voiced 
their opposition in mass protests led by the DPP in August and October 2008.
31
 Ma 
reacted to the October 2008 demonstration with a statement delivered entirely in 
Taiwanese
32
, evoking Taiwanese identity. The conflict however culminated in the 
large-scale protests that accompanied the visit of PRC envoy Chen Yunlin
33
 to Taipei 
in November 2008, which brought the city to a virtual standstill (Taiwan Apple Daily, 
November 6, 2008, p. A27). The protest of Summer and Autumn 2008 showed the 
strength of a Taiwan identity shaped by Taiwanization policies. Its principles have 
been accepted as mainstream, and have created patterns of a unique Taiwan identity, 
an imagined community. Many Taiwanese feel that they are politically and culturally 
fundamentally different from Chinese on the mainland. Ma had skillfully used ethnic 
Taiwan identity in the campaign to his advantage, portraying himself and the KMT as 
truly Taiwanese. Subsequent policies by his administration were hence seen as a 
surrender of Taiwanization, a betrayal of the civic and ethnic components of identity, 
and this was perceived as Sinization. 
                                                 
28
 In his inauguration speech he infuriated KMT aboriginal legislators by speaking of Taiwan 
as an “ethnic Chinese society” (China Post, May 22, 2008, p. 1), and with his sharp contrasts to the 
DPP’s terminology of “citizen”. The name changes of the Taiwan Post and the Taiwan Democracy 
Memorial Hall were reverted (Taiwan Times, August 22, 2008, p. 4).  
 
29
 On the traditional Chinese festival, Tomb Sweeping Day (清明節), Ma Ying-jeou hosted a 
ceremony honoring the Yellow Emperor (皇帝), the mythical ancestor of the Chinese. It was the first 
time for a ROC president to host the ceremony; and the government announced that as the Yellow 
Emperor is the common ancestor of all Chinese people and to commemorate him, it would designate 
Tomb Sweeping Day as “Chinese Race Tomb Sweeping Day”. (.…黃帝是中華民族的共同 始祖，政
府為紀念黃帝，將清明節定為「民族掃墓節」). (Central News Agency, April 3, 2009). The term 民
族 can be translated as “race” or “ethnicity” and in this case, means the Chinese race or ethnicity.  
 
30
 The opposition has criticised the Ma administration for being too careful not to offend 
China in many instances, thus endangering the island international standing. The pro-DPP English 
newspaper Taipei Times pointed out that KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄) was referring to Ma 
Ying-jeou as ‘Mister’ Ma instead of President Ma, during his visit to China (Chuang, 2008, p. 1). 
 
31
 The protests on 30 August 2008 and 25 October 2008 attracted 300,000 and 600,000 
participants respectively, according to organizers (Lu and Chang, 2008, p. 1; Chang et al., 2008, p. 1). 
 
32
 He addressed the demands of the protesters during a visit to Keelung (基隆) on 26 October 
2008 (Era News, October 26, 2008). 
 
33
 On the government’s perspective on outcomes of the so-called “Chiang and Chen talks” see 
Lai 2008. 
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The proposed closer economic cooperation with China is likely to create more conflict 
as it is viewed by some sectors to further imperil the islands’ sovereignty. So far Ma 
has always tried to evoke his ethnic Taiwanese side when pressure became too intense. 
It remains to be seen whether he can once again convince the public of his 
Taiwaneseness and balance economic realpolitik with Taiwan identity, especially 
with an opposition likely to focus on his stance on Taiwanization.  
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